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THE SUPREME COURT ACKNOWLEDGES 
CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY TO CONFER 
INFORMATIONAL STANDING IN  
SPOKEO, INC. V. ROBINS 
BRADFORD C. MANK 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins does not 
fully resolve when an intangible injury such as a defendant’s misreporting 
of a plaintiff’s personal information is sufficient to constitute a “concrete 
injury” for Article III standing. However, the Spokeo decision makes clear 
that Congress has a significant role in defining intangible injuries for 
Article III standing beyond what was considered an injury under the 
American or English common law. Some commentators had thought Spokeo 
might overrule the Court’s prior decisions in Akins and Public Citizen, 
which both held that a plaintiff may have standing based solely upon his 
statutory right to information. Instead, the Court in Spokeo reaffirmed its 
informational standing decisions in Akins and Public Citizen.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a 6–2 
decision by Justice Samuel Alito, recognized the significant authority of 
Congress to define intangible injuries such as a statutory right to 
information for the purposes of Article III standing to sue in federal courts.1 
However, the Court emphasized that a plaintiff must prove a concrete injury 
and, therefore, a procedural statutory violation may not automatically 
establish standing.2 The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit 
because the court of appeals had found that the plaintiff had suffered an 
individualized injury from defendant Spokeo, Inc.’s alleged misreporting of 
his personal information, but failed to address whether the alleged injury 
was sufficiently concrete to confer informational standing.3 
While the Spokeo case was pending before the Court, some 
commentators feared that the Court might require plaintiffs to prove a 
supplementary personal harm in addition to a statutory right to information 
and thus limit the ability of citizens to gain access to information from the 
government.4 However, the majority opinion observed that a plaintiff 
enforcing a statutory right “need not allege any additional harm beyond the 
one Congress has identified.”5 The Court cited two prior decisions, Federal 
Election Commission v. Akins6 and Public Citizen v. Department of Justice,7 
which both held the government’s refusal to provide information for which 
Congress has created a statutory right to access constituted a sufficient 
informational injury for Article III standing.8 The Court’s refusal of an 
additional harm standard likely means that any plaintiff seeking information 
pursuant to a federal statute that explicitly grants the right to certain 
information, such as the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),9 may have 
standing based solely upon his statutory right to information without 
alleging that he will suffer additional harms if he does not obtain that 
information.10 The Court’s previous decisions in Akins and Public Citizen 
 
 
 1. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016). 
 2. Id. at 1548–50. 
 3. Id. at 1544–46, 1548, 1550. 
 4. Rebecca Wilhelm, Standing Case Could Affect Environmental Plaintiffs, 211 DAILY 
ENVIRONMENT REPORT (BNA-Bloomberg) A-13, Nov. 2, 2015. 
 5. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
 6. 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998). 
 7. 491 U. S. 440, 449 (1989). 
 8. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50. 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 10. Bradford Mank, The Supreme Court’s Decision and Remand in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 
Postpones the Difficult Standing Issues in Statutory Standing and Identity Theft Cases, CASETEXT (May 
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concluded that Congress may explicitly establish a statutory right to 
information,11 while Spokeo dispelled concerns that the Court might limit 
or overrule prior decisions recognizing informational standing.12 The 
Spokeo decision explicitly recognized that “because Congress is well 
positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III 
requirements, its judgment is also instructive and important” beyond how 
the English and American common law defined such injuries.13 
Part I provides an introduction to standing doctrine. Part II discusses the 
Supreme Court’s informational standing decisions in Public Citizen and 
Akins. Part III discusses how some commentators have raised doubts about 
informational standing, but argues that the Spokeo decision reaffirms the 
validity of informational standing without proof of additional harm. 
I. ARTICLE III CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING14 
While the Constitution does not explicitly mandate that plaintiffs have 
standing to file suit in federal courts, the Supreme Court has inferred 
limitations on justiciability from the Constitution’s Article III restriction of 
judicial decisions to “Cases” and “Controversies” to ensure that the plaintiff 
has a genuine interest and stake in a case.15 The Court’s three-part standing 
test requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” 
which is (a) “concrete and particularized” and (b) “actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) “there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . 
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result 
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and 
 
 
16, 2016), https://casetext.com/posts/the-supreme-courts-decision-and-remand-in-spokeo-inc-v-robins-
postpones-the-difficult-standing-issues-in-statutory-standing-and-identity-theft-cases. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 14. The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing articles cited in footnote *. 
 15. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of 
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—
to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.” 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 339–42 (2006) 
(explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case and controversy requirement 
necessitates standing limitations); Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 7; see generally 
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 
1036–38 (2009) (discussing debate whether Constitution implicitly requires standing to sue). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/11
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(3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will 
be redressed by a favorable decision.”16 A plaintiff has the burden of 
establishing all three prongs of the standing test for each form of relief 
sought.17 A federal court must dismiss a case without deciding the merits if 
the plaintiff fails to meet the constitutional standing test.18 
Standing requirements are related to broader constitutional principles. 
Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.19 
Additionally, standing requirements support separation of powers principles 
defining the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches 
of government so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the proper—and 
properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’”20 The Court’s 
standing decisions, however, are complicated and arguably inconsistent in 
defining to what extent separation of powers principles limit the standing of 
suits challenging alleged executive branch under-enforcement or non-
enforcement of congressional requirements mandated in a statute.21 
For example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife22 the Supreme Court, in 
an opinion by Justice Scalia, interpreted the Court’s standing doctrine to 
require a plaintiff to show that she has “suffered an injury-in-fact,” which is 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.”23 Justice Scalia’s Lujan opinion suggested that allowing a 
plaintiff who has not suffered a concrete injury to sue the U.S. Government 
to challenge its alleged failure to enforce the law would improperly interfere 
 
 
 16. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted); Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 9. 
 17. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 351–52; Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief 
sought.”); Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 9. 
 18. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–43; Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (“[W]e have 
an obligation to assure ourselves that [petitioner] had Article III standing at the outset of the litigation.”); 
Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 7. 
 19. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340; FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998); Mank, 
Informational Standing, supra note , at 7. 
 20. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); Mank, 
Informational Standing, supra note , at 7–8. 
 21. For example, Justice Scalia used separation of powers concerns about protecting the discretion 
of the Executive Branch to limit the scope of judicial authority in Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–78. But see id. 
at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion’s restrictive approach to standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the 
expense—not of the Courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates”). See 
generally Mank, Informational Standing, supra note  (discussing debate over whether standing 
requirements support or undermine Constitution’s separation of powers principles). 
 22. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations and quotation marks omitted); Mank, Informational 
Standing, supra note , at 8. 
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with both Article III standing principles and the President’s Article II 
constitutional authority to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”24 
Some commentators have contended that Justice Scalia’s restrictive 
approach to standing hinders the role of Congress in permitting judicial 
oversight to guarantee that the executive branch obeys enacted laws.25 
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia in Lujan acknowledged that Congress may 
“elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto 
injuries that were previously inadequate in law.”26 Furthermore, in footnote 
seven of Lujan, the Court created an exception to its otherwise narrow 
approach to standing by observing that plaintiffs who may suffer a concrete 
injury resulting from a procedural violation by the government are entitled 
to a more relaxed application of both the imminent injury and the 
redressability standing requirements to sue in federal court.27 
In his concurring opinion in Lujan, Justice Anthony Kennedy maintained 
that Congress may use its legislative authority under Article I of the 
Constitution to expand common law limitations on what constitutes a 
concrete injury, although Congress may not entirely eliminate the concrete 
injury requirement implicit in Article III.28 The Spokeo decision, which 
Justice Kennedy joined, favorably cited his Lujan concurrence when it 
acknowledged that Congress has a significant role in defining the scope of 
intangible injuries.29 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lujan agreed 
with Justice Scalia’s majority opinion that a plaintiff must prove that he has 
sustained a concrete injury and that the affiants had failed to do so because 
they had not “acquire[d] airline tickets to the project sites or announce[d] a 
date certain upon which they will return.”30 Justice Kennedy suggested, 
however, that courts recognize that the definition of a concrete injury might 
be broadened “[a]s Government programs and policies become more 
complex and far reaching” and, therefore, that “we must be sensitive to the 
articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in our 
common-law tradition.”31 He reasoned that “Congress has the power to 
 
 
 24. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); Solimine, supra note 15, at 1029. 
 25. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (arguing 
courts should not use standing doctrine as “a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power”). 
 26. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; Solimine, supra note 15, at 1029 & n.27. 
 27. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7; see Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 10–13. 
 28. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579–81 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); 
Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 4, 47–49. 
 29. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). 
 30. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Mank, 
Informational Standing, supra note , at 47. 
 31. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 47. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/11
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define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case 
or controversy where none existed before,” although he limited his 
potentially broad interpretation of congressional authority to modify 
standing requirements with the caution that in “exercising this power, 
however, Congress must at the very least identify the injury it seeks to 
vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.”32 
Justice Kennedy explained that separation of powers concerns limit the 
Judiciary to the resolution of concrete injuries and, thus, that “the 
requirement of concrete injury confines the Judicial Branch to its proper, 
limited role in the constitutional framework of Government.”33 
II. INFORMATIONAL STANDING: PUBLIC CITIZEN AND AKINS 
A.  Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice 
In its 1989 Public Citizen decision, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the government’s denial of information that the public is entitled to by 
statute constitutes a sufficient injury for Article III standing, although the 
Court did not fully explore the boundaries of informational standing.34 The 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) argued that Public Citizen and the 
Washington Legal Foundation lacked standing to sue because they failed to 
allege an “injury sufficiently concrete and specific to confer standing” since 
they “advanced a general grievance shared in substantially equal measure 
by all or a large class of citizens.”35 Following decisions approving 
informational standing under the Freedom of Information Act, the Court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to seek information pursuant to 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act’s (“FACA”)36 statutory mandates.37 
The Court reasoned:  
As when an agency denies requests for information under the 
Freedom of Information Act, refusal to permit appellants to scrutinize 
the ABA Committee's activities to the extent FACA allows 
constitutes a sufficiently distinct injury to provide standing to sue. 
Our decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act have 
 
 
 32. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 47 
 33. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 48. 
 34. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989); Mank, Informational Standing, 
supra note , at 15–16. Justice Scalia took no part in the Court’s consideration of the case or its decision. 
Pub. Citizen at 442. 
 35. Pub. Citizen at 448–49. 
 36. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 1. 
 37. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 16. 
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never suggested that those requesting information under it need show 
more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records.38 
Furthermore, the Court rejected the ABA’s argument that the plaintiffs did 
not have standing because they alleged a generalized grievance shared by 
many other citizens.39 The Court stated: 
The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same 
complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA 
does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury, any more than the fact that 
numerous citizens might request the same information under the 
Freedom of Information Act entails that those who have been denied 
access do not possess a sufficient basis to sue.40 
B. Akins 
In its 1998 Akins decision,41 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Stephen Breyer (joined by five other justices, including Justice Kennedy) 
concluded that informational injuries resulting from the government’s 
denial of information that a statute requires to be made available to the 
public are potentially sufficient for Article III standing.42 Akins considered 
whether the plaintiff voters had standing to challenge a Federal Election 
Commission decision that a lobbying group, the American Israeli Political 
Action Committee (“AIPAC”), was not a “political committee” within the 
definition of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”),43 and, 
therefore, was not required to disclose its donors, contributions, or 
expenditures.44 FECA “imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure 
requirements upon groups that fall within the Act's definition of a ‘political 
committee.’”45 
The Court held that the plaintiff voters had suffered a “concrete and 
particular” injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing because they were 
deprived of their statutory right to receive designated “information [which] 
would help them…to evaluate candidates for public office,” even though 
many other voters shared the same informational injury as the plaintiff.46 
 
 
 38. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449. 
 39. Id. at 449–50; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 16. 
 40. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449–50. 
 41. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
 42. Id. at 21–25; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 17–20. 
 43. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–457 (2012) (FECA has been recodified as 52 U.S.C. § 30101–30146 (2014)). 
 44. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–18; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 17–18. 
 45. Akins, 524 U.S. at 14–15 (summarizing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432–434). 
 46. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 17–20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/11
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Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that the plaintiffs did not 
have standing because their injury was common to the public at large, so 
therefore they did not have a particularized injury essential for standing.47 
The Akins decision held that Congress had “the constitutional power to 
authorize federal courts to adjudicate this lawsuit.”48 The Court concluded 
that the government’s denial of information to the plaintiff voters for which 
the Act required disclosure was a constitutionally sufficient “genuine 
‘injury in fact.’”49 The Court explained, “[t]he “’injury in fact’ that 
respondents have suffered consists of their inability to obtain 
information . . . the statute requires that AIPAC make public.”50 
Furthermore, the Court specifically found that this deprivation of 
information that the plaintiffs could use “to evaluate candidates for public 
office” constituted a “concrete and particular” injury.51 Additionally, the 
Akins decision reasoned that the Court in Public Citizen had “held that a 
plaintiff suffers an ‘injury in fact’ when the plaintiff fails to obtain 
information which must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute” and 
implied that the same reasoning applied to the facts of Akins.52 
The Akins decision rejected the government’s argument that the 
informational injury to the plaintiffs was too abstract or generalized to 
constitute a concrete injury because the statute specifically authorized the 
right of voters to request information from the Commission.53 
Distinguishing prior cases rejecting standing for generalized grievances, the 
Akins decision reasoned that Article III standing was permissible even if 
many people suffered similar injuries as long as those injuries were concrete 
and not abstract.54 The Court declared that the fact that “an injury is widely 
shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an interest for Article 
III purposes. Such an interest, where sufficiently concrete, may count as an 
‘injury in fact.’”55  
Thus, the Akins decision recognized that a plaintiff who suffers an actual, 
concrete injury may sue even though many others have suffered similar 
 
 
 47. Akins, 524 U.S. at 33–37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , 
at 21. 
 48. Akins, 524 U.S. at 20; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 18. 
 49. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 18. 
 50. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 
 51. Id.; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 18. 
 52. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 
 53. Akins, 524 U.S. at 13–21; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19. 
 54. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19. 
 55. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added); Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19. 
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injuries, such as in a “widespread mass tort.”56 Accordingly, Akins clarified 
that courts should not deny standing merely because large numbers of 
persons have the same or similar injuries so long as those injuries are 
concrete.57 Furthermore, the Akins decision stressed that courts should 
strongly consider Congress’ intent in defining statutory rights when 
determining whether a statutory injury is concrete or abstract.58  
III. DOUBTS ABOUT INFORMATIONAL STANDING AND SPOKEO’S 
REASSURANCE OF INFORMATIONAL STANDING 
A. Some Commentators Question Informational Standing 
Professors Evan Tsen Lee and Josephine Mason Ellis have argued that 
informational statutes such as FOIA essentially eliminate the requirement 
for a concrete injury, and, thus, go beyond even Justice Kennedy’s approach 
in his Lujan concurring opinion that gave Congress broad authority to define 
injuries as long as the concrete injury requirement remains.59 They argue 
that informational statutes potentially allow anyone to sue the government 
to receive nonexempt records under the statute for “sheer curiosity.”60 They 
contrast statutory “birther” cases where plaintiffs were allowed to sue 
government agencies under FOIA to obtain documents relating to President 
Barack Obama’s birth with a constitutional suit in which a court held that a 
plaintiff seeking to challenge whether President Obama was a “natural born 
citizen” could not do so because the complaint was a generalized grievance 
too vague to confer standing.61 They interpret informational standing cases 
as courts allowing Congress to effectively waive the requirement of a 
genuine concrete injury.62 
Lee and Ellis argue that the Court’s Article III jurisprudence fails to 
explain the Supreme Court’s insistence on a three-part standing test and its 
 
 
 56. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19–20. 
 57. Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19–20. 
 58. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24–25; Mank, Informational Standing, supra note , at 19–20. 
 59. Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 169, 193–201 (2012). 
 60. Id. at 194. 
 61. Id. at 196–98. Compare Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 512, 514, 519–21 (E.D. Pa. 
2008) (dismissing for lack of standing plaintiff’s suit under Natural Born Citizen Clause of U.S. CONST., 
art. II, § 1, cl. 4), aff’d, 586 F.3d 234, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2009) with Strunk v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 770 F. 
Supp. 2d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (denying summary judgment in FOIA suit seeking access to documents 
regarding President Obama’s deceased mother’s international travel because a genuine issue of material 
fact remained as to the sufficiency of the Department of Homeland Security’s search for the documents). 
 62. Id. at 194–201. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/11
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willingness to waive those requirements in informational standing cases.63 
Nor does Justice Kennedy’s view in his Lujan concurrence that Congress 
can define concrete injury more broadly than the common law address how 
courts have eliminated the injury requirement in informational standing 
cases. 64 Instead, they propose that: 
[The] Court openly recognize Congress’s power to relax or eliminate 
any of the usual Article III requisites where standing to vindicate 
procedural rights is concerned and to replace those usual 
requirements with a “naked” zone of interests test. We propose that 
there are really two tiers to the standing doctrine: one tier for 
traditional common law review, in which the plaintiff must meet the 
usual requirements of injury, causation, and redressability, and 
another tier for procedural rights review, in which the plaintiff need 
only show that she is within the zone of interests that Congress had 
in mind when it drafted the statute in question.65 
Alternatively, a court that takes the concrete injury requirement seriously 
might follow Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Akins and overrule prior 
cases allowing informational standing.66 Before Justice Scalia’s death in 
February 2016,67 some commentators at the time of the Spokeo oral 
argument on November 2, 2015 speculated that the Court in Spokeo might 
overrule informational standing.68 One may hypothesize that his death 
diminished the possibility of a decision limiting statutory standing, although 
commentators have disagreed on that point and we cannot know for certain 
how he would have voted in Spokeo.69 
 
 
 63. Id. at 221–22. 
 64. Id. at 217–22. 
 65. Id. at 225. 
 66. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 33–37 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 67. Judy Melinek, Justice Scalia's unexamined death points to a problem, CNN (Feb. 20, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-melinek/. 
 68. See Wilhelm, supra note 4 (citing commentators speculating at time of Spokeo oral argument 
on November 2, 2015 that the Court in Spokeo might overrule informational standing doctrine). 
 69. Compare Eric Troutman & Scott Goldsmith, Spokeo Without Scalia: The Fate Of No-Injury 
Class Actions, LAW360 (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/762088/spokeo-without-
scalia-the-fate-of-no-injury-class-actions (suggesting Justice Scalia’s death dramatically changed the 
likelihood that the Spokeo decision would narrow statutory standing), with Maxwell Stearns, The 
Powerful Voice: Justice Scalia, Statutory Standing, and Narrowing the Spokeo Class, 
https://casetext.com/posts/the-powerful-voice-justice-scalia-statutory-standing-and-narrowing-the-
spokeo-class (arguing that Spokeo was an unsuitable case for Justice Scalia’s project of limiting statutory 
standing).  
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B. Spokeo Reaffirms Informational Standing 
The Spokeo decision held that a plaintiff alleging a statutory injury in 
violation of a federal statute must allege not only an individualized injury, 
but also a concrete injury to satisfy the standing requirement of an injury in 
fact.70 In concluding that the plaintiff had standing, the Ninth Circuit had 
emphasized that plaintiff Robins alleged an injury to his personal interests 
in how the defendant Spokeo, Inc. had mishandled his personal credit 
information and thus had allegedly caused an individualized injury to the 
plaintiff.71 The Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit because 
the court of appeals found only that Robins had an individualized injury and 
had failed to consider whether he also had a concrete injury.72  
The Spokeo decision emphasized that “[a] ‘concrete‘ injury must be ‘de 
facto’; that is, it must actually exist.”73 The Court further explained, “[w]hen 
we have used the adjective ‘concrete,’ we have meant to convey the usual 
meaning of the term—‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”74 Accordingly, the Spokeo 
decision reasoned that “[c]oncreteness, therefore, is quite different from 
particularization.” 75 The Court then further observed that the “risk of real 
harm” can satisfy the concreteness requirement, and, as an example, 
commented that tort victims may recover “even if their harms may be 
difficult to prove or measure.”76 On the other hand, Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion explained that a reporting inaccuracy that does not present a 
“material risk of harm,” such as an “incorrect zip code,” does not constitute 
a concrete injury.77 
Crucially, the Spokeo decision treated the government’s violation of a 
statute granting the public access to information held by the government as 
a concrete injury without the need for the plaintiff to prove an additional 
harm from the denial of the information.78 The Court explained, “[j]ust as 
the common law permitted suit in such instances, the violation of a 
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient in some circumstances 
to constitute injury in fact. In other words, a plaintiff in such a case need not 
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”79 The 
 
 
 70. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545, 1548, 1550 (2016). 
 71. Id. at 1544–46. 
 72. Id. at 1545, 1550. 
 73. Id. at 1548. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1549. 
 77. Id. at 1550. 
 78. Id. at 1549–50. 
 79. Id. at 1549. 
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majority opinion then cited Akins and Public Citizen as precedent 
supporting its view that a plaintiff may suffer a concrete injury from the 
violation of a procedural right without proving additional harm.80 
The clear implication of the Spokeo decision is that a plaintiff has a 
concrete injury if the government denies him information that he 
specifically requests pursuant to an informational statute such as FOIA.81 In 
a 1993 article, now Chief Justice John Roberts, who joined the Spokeo 
majority opinion, defended Justice Scalia’s relatively strict approach to 
standing in his Lujan opinion,82 but acknowledged that the Lujan decision 
did not call into question the Public Citizen decision’s holding that a party 
who is denied information by a government agency that he is explicitly 
entitled to under a statute has standing even if other citizens seek that same 
information.83 The Spokeo decision eliminates any doubts about 
informational standing where the government denies information to a 
plaintiff who is entitled to that information by a statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Spokeo does not fully resolve 
when an intangible injury such as a defendant’s misreporting of a plaintiff’s 
personal information is sufficient to constitute a “concrete injury” for 
Article III standing .84 However, the Spokeo decision makes clear that 
Congress has a significant role in defining intangible injuries for Article III 
standing beyond what was considered an injury under the American or 
English common law.85 Some commentators had thought Spokeo might 
overrule the Court’s prior decisions in Akins and Public Citizen, which both 
held that a plaintiff may have standing based solely upon his statutory right 
to information.86 Instead, the Court in Spokeo reaffirmed its informational 
standing decisions in Akins and Public Citizen.87 
 
 
 80. Id. at 1549–50. 
 81. Id. 
 82. John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219. 
 83. Id. at 1228 n.60. 
 84. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–50. 
 85. Id. at 1549–50. 
 86. See supra Part III.A and Wilhelm, supra note 4 (citing commentators speculating that the Court 
in Spokeo might overrule informational standing doctrine). 
 87. See supra Part III.B. 
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